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ABSTRACT: The Insight considers the case law of the Court of Justice concerning the notion of “finally 
disposed”, i.e. a constitutive element of the European ne bis in idem principle. In order to trigger 
the right not to be tried or punished twice, a national decision must be final and has to contain a 
sufficient determination of the merits of the case. So far, the Court of Justice has interpreted these 
requirements extensively, by identifying mutual recognition and mutual trust as the engines of the 
European ne bis in idem. Nonetheless, the Court’s recent preliminary ruling in Kossowski clarifies 
that a lack of an adequate investigation can amount to limiting the scope of the principle at stake. 
Mutual trust is not blind and national judicial authorities are entitled to make a critical appraisal on 
the foreign authority’s activity, insofar as the reasons stated in its decision closing a case evidently 
show the lack of a detailed investigation. Following the recent judgment Aranyosi and Căldăraru, 
Kossowski adds a new crack in the wall of mutual recognition and mutual trust. However, the Court 
shows a clear favor integrationis: these principles can be limited only in exceptional circumstances, 
where it is necessary to provide a cure for severe pathologies affecting the foreign decision. 
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I. A way out of the rush to prosecute: the principles of mutual 
recognition and mutual trust and the European ne bis in idem  
Ne bis in idem is widely accepted as a general principle of law, barring multiple prosecu-
tions or punishments against the same defendant, on the basis of the same facts. The 
principle plays a key role in the EU legal order, where it applies to several domains, 
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ranging from competition to criminal law.1 As such, it has both a structural and individ-
ual dimension, since it ensures legal certainty and the accused’s protection “vis-à-vis the 
jus puniendi ”.2 
At the EU level, the principle is enshrined in Art. 50 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and Art. 54 of the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement (CISA) and has an autonomous meaning.3 Since the threat of a 
second prosecution in another Member State may discourage circulation, the European 
ne bis in idem is deemed a corollary of the freedom of movement of persons.4 This 
principle is even more important due to the absence of rules common to all Member 
States for determining jurisdiction in criminal matters. In fact, it requires foreign final 
decisions to be recognized as a last word on the merits of a case which could fall under 
the State’s jurisdiction.5  
The need to prevent or solve conflicts between national judicial authorities has 
urged the Court of Justice to uphold an extensive interpretation of the scope of applica-
tion of the principle. For instance, the Court reads the notion of idem from a factual and 
historical perspective, irrespectively of legal qualification of a conduct under national 
law.6 A similar substantive approach is followed in relation to the concept of sanction: 
even administrative penalties can be criminal in nature and amount to limiting further 
exercise of jus puniendi.7 
Nonetheless, the assessment of the notion of “bis ” has proven to be particularly dif-
ficult, since the cross-border applicability of the principle can be hampered by the set of 
highly fragmented national procedural laws. Seeking a way forward, the Court of Justice 
has identified mutual recognition as the engine of the European ne bis in idem.8 De-
 
1 On the conceptual fragmentation of the principle, B. VAN BOCKEL, The ne bis in idem principle in the 
European Union legal order: between scope and substance, in ERA Forum, 2012, p. 325 et seq. 
2 Opinion of AG Jarabo Colomer of 8 April 2008, case C-297/07, Bourquain, para. 48. 
3 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 November 2010, case C-261/09, Mantello, para. 38. Art. 50 en-
shrines both national and European ne bis in idem, while Art. 54 only covers transboundary situations. 
4 Court of Justice, judgment of 9March 2006, case C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, paras 33-34. The principle 
also prevents the risk of absconding, which is inherent to a space without internal borders: Court of Jus-
tice, judgment of 27 May 2014, case C-129/14 PPU, Spasic, paras 63-65. 
5 It has been underlined that the principle strengthens the so called fifth freedom of movement, 
namely the circulation of national judicial decisions in the EU: C. AMALFITANO, Conflitti di giurisdizione e 
riconoscimento delle decisioni penali nell'Unione europea, Milano: Giuffré, 2006, p. 102. 
6 Such interpretation has been confirmed even if Art. 50 of the Charter uses the word “offence”. Van 
Esbroeck, cit., para. 36; Court of Justice, judgment of 28 September 2006, case C-150/05, Van Straaten, 
paras 48-50. The same reading applies in the domain of competition law: Court of Justice, judgment of 10 
May 2007, case C-328/05 P, SGL Carbon AG.  
7 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 2012, case C-489/10, Bonda ; judgment of 26 February 2013, 
case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson. 
8 A. WEYEMBERGH, La jurisprudence de la CJ relative au principe ne bis in idem: une contribution es-
sentielle à la reconnaissance mutuelle en matière pénale, in A. ROSAS, E. LEVITS, Y. BOT (eds), La Cour de 
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spite significant discrepancies among national legal orders, domestic judicial authorities 
are required to accept a decision delivered in another Member State, whatever the out-
come of the determination of the merits of the case is. 
A foreign judicial decision can be recognized for the purposes of the ne bis in idem 
principle only insofar as it finally disposes of the proceeding. The opposing interests 
underpinning mutual recognition and the implications of the notion of final decision 
lock swords here. The core issue is the scope and width of the scrutiny which the na-
tional judicial authority is entitled to make while assessing the finality of a foreign deci-
sion. An in-depth analysis is essential for the operation of the European ne bis in idem, 
but is capable of unduly restricting mutual trust and mutual recognition. 
Clarifications on this matter have come from a handful of judgments by the Court 
of Justice. Such case law has been further specified by the recent preliminary ruling in 
Kossowski,9 where the referring court asked whether an order of discontinuance of in-
vestigative proceedings for lack of sufficient grounds issued by a Polish authority could 
prevent a German prosecutor’s office from starting investigations against the same per-
son, for the same material facts. The recent judgment goes into the notion of final deci-
sion for the purposes of Arts 50 of the Charter and 54 CISA and offers the opportunity 
for an overall analysis of the subject. What is more, it sheds light on the implications of 
this constitutive element of the ne bis in idem for the national judicial authorities’ activi-
ty, in light of the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust. 
II. Has the trial been “finally disposed”? The case law of the Court of 
Justice and the recent clarifications provided in Kossowski 
The presence of a final decision is featured as an essential element of the ne bis in 
idem. Art. 50 of the Charter refers to any person who “has already been finally acquitted 
or convicted”,10 while Art. 54 CISA bars further prosecution if the “trial has been finally 
disposed”. 
Despite the textual differences, the notion of final judicial decision has the same 
meaning under both provisions. In particular, the Court has clarified that Art. 54 and the 
other provisions of the CISA concerning ne bis in idem are to be interpreted in accord-
 
Justice et la construction de l’Europe: analyses et perspectives de soixante ans de jurisprudence, Den 
Haag: Asser Press, 2013, pp. 542-544. 
9 Court of Justice, judgment of 29 June 2016, case C-486/14, Kossowski. 
10 This wording is identical to the text of Art. 4 of Protocol no. 7 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights and has the same meaning and scope as regards the application of the principle within a 
Member State: Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Explanations on Art. 50. See 
also Court of Justice, judgment of 27 May 2014, case C-129/14 PPU, Spasic.  
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ance with the Charter, the primary source concerning the protection of fundamental 
rights in the EU legal order.11 
No reference is made to a specific kind of judicial decision, so that any outcome of 
the first proceeding is in principle capable of preventing the subject from being tried or 
punished twice. However, according to the Court of Justice, such judicial decision must 
fulfil two criteria: it must have acquired finality and contain a determination on the mer-
its of the case. 
ii.1. The procedural criterion: the final nature of a decision 
The requirement of finality is met when the judicial decision is irrevocable, that is to say 
when no more ordinary remedies are available under the law of the State.12 It follows 
that, in principle,13 the ne bis in idem does not preclude parallel proceedings, as long as 
they are ongoing. This holds true also for the European dimension of the principle, 
which per se is not intended to protect a suspect from parallel or subsequent investiga-
tions undertaken in different Member States.14 The current legal background increases 
the risk of conflicting and overlapping jurisdictions, as national authorities often take 
part in a rush to prosecute.15 From this point of view, as underlined by AG Sharpston,16 
the ne bis in idem is a mere complement to a set of comprehensive rules on the alloca-
tion of criminal jurisdiction between Member States. 
Whether a procedural obstacle to the opening or continuation of criminal proceed-
ings exists is determined by the law of the State of the issuing authority. Therefore, the 
main term of reference is the national legal order,17 with regard to the specific conse-
quences it attaches to a certain decision. At the same time, domestic laws are to be in-
terpreted in light of EU law and of the autonomous meaning of Arts 54 CISA and 50 of 
the Charter. For instance, according to the Court, the sole fact that a national criminal 
 
11 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 2014, case C-398/12, M., para. 31. On the need to interpret EU 
secondary law in light of the Charter: F. BESTAGNO, I rapporti tra la Carta e le fonti secondarie di diritto 
dell'UE nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2015, p. 259 et 
seq. 
12 Exceptional judicial remedies neither preclude the ne bis in idem principle under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 10 February, application no. 
14939/03, Zolotoukin v. Russia, para. 108. 
13 Art. 58 CISA allows the application of broader national provisions on the ne bis in idem principle 
with regard to judicial decisions taken abroad. 
14 Court of Justice, judgment of 22 December 2008, case C-491/07, Turanský, para. 44. 
15 The attempts to regulate the matter at EU level have failed so far and have eventually resulted in 
the adoption of merely soft-law mechanisms: Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of the Council of 30 No-
vember 2009 on prevention and settlement of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings. 
16 Opinion of AG Sharpston of 6 February 2014, case C-398/12, M., para. 53: “Unless and until the leg-
islature addresses the issue of parallel proceedings more comprehensively, the principle of ne bis in idem 
in Article 54 CISA will, of necessity, have to be pressed into service to fill the gap”. 
17 Mantello, cit., para. 46. 
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procedure would necessitate the reopening of the proceedings in relation to a judg-
ment delivered in absentia does not per se impede to consider a decision as final, for 
the purposes of the European ne bis in idem.18 Likewise, the reopening of criminal in-
vestigation founded on the availability of new evidence or facts does not affect the final-
ity of an order making a finding of non lieu. On the one hand, the right not to be tried or 
punished twice allows for “the mere continuation” of the proceedings in the State where 
the order was made, in order to assess the new elements. On the other hand, it pre-
cludes “the exceptional bringing of separate proceedings based on new evidence”, in 
another State.19 
Moreover, neither the nature of the national authority involved,20 nor the formal 
qualification of a certain decision under domestic law should be taken into account. In 
fact, the relevant provisions make no specific reference to these aspects, so the Court of 
Justice urges national authorities to attach primary importance to the procedural effects 
coming from a decision. The Court of Justice has acknowledged that even decisions tak-
en by a public prosecutor, without the involvement of a court, can bar new investiga-
tions or proceedings in another Member State. In Gözütok and Brügge, the Court was 
confronted with two out-of-court settlements, through which a German and a Dutch 
public prosecutors discontinued proceedings in return of payment of a certain sum de-
finitively. In light of the relevant domestic procedural laws, the Luxembourg Court con-
tended that the literal interpretation of Art. 54 CISA and the need to preserve its useful 
effect required such decisions to be considered as finally disposing of the proceed-
ings.21 In the same way, the recent preliminary ruling in Kossowsky confirms that even 
an order of discontinuance delivered during criminal investigations for lack of evidence 
can fulfil the requirement under consideration.22 Once again, it all depends on the spe-
cific procedural consequences that the national legal order attaches to that decision. 
ii.2. The substantive criterion: the determination of the merits of the 
case 
As we have seen, the notion of “finally disposed” requires an assessment of the proce-
dural implications of a national decision concerning the same defendant and the same 
facts. However, such appraisal sits at odd with those decisions that are not intended to 
settle a matter, but amount to a (merely) procedural interruption or termination of pro-
ceedings. Orders of discontinuance issued by a public prosecutor, decisions delivered 
 
18 Bourquain, cit. para. 40. 
19 M., cit. para. 40. 
20 The Court of Justice often refers to “decisions of public bodies which have become final”: Kos-
sowski, cit., para. 44. 
21 Gözütok and Brügge, cit., paras 38-40. 
22 Kossowski, cit., paras 35-38. 
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during the investigative phase, judgments declaring lack of evidence or acquitting the 
accused because prosecution is time-barred are potential vivid examples.  
Therefore, the Court of Justice also urges national authorities to consider whether 
an adequate evaluation of the merits of the case has occurred. Besides the procedural 
requirement of finality, the right not to be tried or punished twice is further conditioned 
upon a sufficient substantive determination of the accused’s criminal liability.  
This additional and cumulative condition is necessary in order to avoid a side effect 
of the freedom of movement of persons and decisions in the European judicial area. 
Overreliance on the notion of procedural finality would in fact increase the risk of im-
punity, as prosecution in another Member State would be precluded despite the ab-
sence of an assessment whatever of the unlawful conduct.23 Such a solution would al-
low for an abuse of the protection granted by the principle. Moreover, it would hamper 
the prevention and combating of crime within the area of freedom, security and jus-
tice,24 a primary objective of the European legal order, enshrined in Art. 3, para. 2, TEU. 
The early case law on the interpretation of Art. 54 CISA addressed this requirement 
as an ancillary concern. In Gasparini, the Court stated that an acquittal grounded on the 
expiration of the statute of limitation period was capable of barring further prosecution, 
but did not take into consideration the substance of the case. In particular, it was satis-
fied by the explanations provided by the national court in the order for reference, ac-
cording to which coherent evidence on the criminal liability of the accused had been 
collected. 
The Court was soon and more directly confronted with this problem in relation to 
decisions issued by public prosecutors during investigations. In the afore-mentioned 
Gözütok and Brügge joined cases, the two out-of-court settlements at stake were condi-
tioned on the determination of the accused’s liability. On that basis the offender was 
entitled to negotiate with the public prosecutor, barring further prosecution. On the 
contrary, a decision to discontinue prosecution only on the grounds of the initiation of 
similar investigations in another Member State was considered insufficient in order to 
trigger Art. 54 CISA.25 Due to the early stage of investigations, the prosecutor had no 
opportunity of assessing the available evidence and his decision was only intended to 
prevent a conflict of jurisdictions. 
The factual and procedural background was slightly different in Kossowski, where a 
Polish authority started investigation soon after a similar file had been opened in Ger-
many. It didn’t take too long before the detrimental effects of such a rush to prosecute 
became evident. The unlawful acts had been committed in Germany and the Polish 
public prosecutor was not in a position to gather sufficient evidence: the accused re-
 
23 Kossowski, cit., paras 47-50. 
24 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 March 2005, case C-469/03, Miraglia, paras 33-34. 
25 Miraglia, cit., paras 28-35. 
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fused to give a statement, while both the victim and a hearsay witness lived in Germany 
and therefore couldn’t be interviewed. Consequently, investigation in Poland was ter-
minated for lack of evidence, by the means of an order of discontinuance having final 
nature under Polish procedural law. In this context, the Luxembourg Court contended 
that the lack of a detailed evidence had prevented an adequate appraisal on the merits 
of the case: the substantive condition for invoking the ne bis in idem principle was not 
fulfilled. 
This finding ultimately clarifies the position of the Court in relation to definitive de-
cisions on the inadequacy of evidence and distinguishes from the precedents on the 
subject.26 The Court of Justice underlines that the requirement of a sufficient determi-
nation of the merits of the case has on its part procedural roots, since it implies the 
availability of adequate evidence and a diligent investigation. A sufficient body of evi-
dence constitutes a minimum threshold which has to be reached in order to consider 
that a careful examination of the conducts has occurred.  
Consequently, on the one hand, any decision delivered on these bases should in 
principle trigger the right not to be tried or punished twice in another Member State, 
whatever the outcome is and whatever grounds it is based on. Moreover, this solution 
should apply even in case of primarily procedural decisions, such as judgments or or-
ders declaring the unfruitful expiration of the statute of limitation period. On the other 
hand, any decision declaring lack of evidence should be handled carefully for the pur-
poses of the European ne bis in idem, as it may give shape to either a poor investigation 
or an incomplete assessment of the case.  
Such statement bears potential systemic implications for the functioning of judicial 
cooperation mechanisms in the EU, in particular as far as the national authorities’ role is 
concerned. 
III. Mutual trust is not blind: the lack of a detailed investigation as 
a limit to the application of the ne bis in idem principle 
Mutual recognition and mutual confidence are widely acknowledged as general princi-
ples of the EU legal order27 and founding pillars of judicial cooperation in criminal mat-
ters.28 Accordingly, as we have seen, the Court of Justice has identified mutual recogni-
tion as the engine of the European ne bis in idem. In a spirit of mutual trust, despite the 
fragmentation of national procedural laws, domestic judicial authorities must rely on 
the outcome of the proceedings conducted abroad. In particular, they have to accept at 
 
26 M., cit., para. 30. 
27 Court of Justice, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, para. 161. Mutual trust is founded on Art. 2 
TEU. 
28 C. JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition in EU law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 
132 et seq. 
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face value the final nature and the assessment of the merits of the case made by the 
authorities of another Member State. Recognition and trust apply even if national crim-
inal procedural or substantive law would have led to a different solution of the case 
concerned.29 
However, the assessment of the “finally disposed” constitutive element of the ne bis 
in idem is particularly delicate. In relation to the final nature of a decision, the authority 
before which the principle is invoked benefits from guidance from the foreign issuing 
authority concerning the precise procedural implications of its activity. In case of in-
complete or unclear information, a duty to ask for additional explanations flows from 
mutual recognition and mutual trust. In any event, the receiving authority has limited 
discretion, because its evaluation stems from the wording of another domestic proce-
dural law, which he is not entitled to interpret or elaborate on. The criterion at stake 
therefore requires such authority to serve as bouche de la loi etrangère. 
The assessment concerning the requirement of the sufficient determination of the 
merits of the case is, instead, much more elusive. Being inextricably linked to the out-
comes of the first trial, it bears the risk of opening Pandora’s box of the procedural and 
substantive adequacy of the foreign authority’s activity. A lack of self-restraint on the 
part of the judicial authority in charge of the second proceeding may then result in a 
critical appraisal blocking the recognition of the foreign decision for the purposes of the 
ne bis in idem principle. In short, it could increase mutual distrust. 
At the same time, dwelling on such analysis wouldn’t necessarily be detrimental for 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The factual background of Kossowski highlights 
that inefficient coordination between national authorities and poor investigation can 
result in the risk of impunity in the European judicial area. A lack of diligence or efficien-
cy on the part of the winner of the rush to prosecute is capable of hampering the effec-
tiveness of crime prevention and prosecution in Europe as a whole. Therefore, a critical 
appraisal of the first trial could unveil inconsistencies or evidentiary lacunas affecting 
the (final) decision, in particular in the event of either orders delivered during the inves-
tigation phase or acquittals for lack of evidence. Moreover, negative effects for either 
the accused or the victim could ensue. On the one hand, the final word on the alleged 
offender’s criminal liability would be based on incomplete evidence. On the other hand, 
in the event of an acquittal, the victim would not be able to obtain compensation for the 
damages arising from the crime.30 
Mutual recognition can have high costs and a balance between opposing interests 
underpinning judicial cooperation in criminal matters has to be made. In the end, in 
 
29 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 February 2003, joined cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gözütok and 
Brügge, para. 33; judgment of 28 September 2006, case C-467/04, Gasparini, para. 30. 
30 In his opinion in Kossowski, AG Bot stressed the importance of the “basic rights of the victim”: or-
der of discontinuance issued by the Polish authorities showed that the victim was not heard and did not 
receive information on the proceeding. Opinion of AG Bot, Kossowski, cit., paras 80-83. 
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particular, such search for a balance reflects the dilemma on the scope and range of the 
powers left to the authority before which the ne bis in idem principle is invoked. 
From this point of view, the recent case law of the Court of Justice has clarified that, 
as a rule, mutual recognition is not absolute and that trust between Member States is 
not blind.31 Albeit in exceptional circumstances, the duties flowing from such principles 
can be limited. Nonetheless, so far, the Court of Justice has been mainly confronted 
with fundamental rights issues. In the joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru,32 the Court 
has identified the protection of absolute fundamental rights from a manifest violation 
as a source of potential limits to these structural principles.33 
The question raised in Kossowski is different and lays at the core of the mecha-
nisms of judicial cooperation across the national borders. In this context, the quest for a 
limit to mutual trust and mutual recognition derives from a critical appraisal of the qual-
ity of the Polish public prosecutor’s investigation. Even if inherent to the notion of mu-
tual trust, such question adds new elements to the Court’s discourse on the subject. In 
accordance with AG Bot, the Court applies by analogy its recent precedents and identi-
fies a new category of situations where mutual recognition and mutual trust must be 
restricted. In particular, it underlines that a decision cannot be characterised as final 
“when it is clear from the reasons [...] that there was no detailed investigation”.34  
Two adjectives give an idea of the opposing driving forces at stake: “clear” and “de-
tailed”.  
The former embodies the preference for mutual trust and mutual recognition. 
Since they can be limited only in exceptional circumstances, a lack of sufficient determi-
nation on the merits of the case must manifestly transpire from the reasons stated in 
the foreign decision. Such lacuna must be clearly highlighted in the foreign decision and 
the receiving authority has to be satisfied with the information provided therein. Inter-
estingly enough, the Court underlines that the sole source of information is the authori-
ty that delivered the first and final decision allegedly determining the merits of the case. 
The second judicial authority, in principle, cannot rely on external sources of infor-
mation: whether a limit has to be imposed on mutual recognition and mutual trust is a 
matter of transparent and effective judicial dialogue. The purpose of the establishment 
of the European judicial area in itself implies that judicial dialogue should come first, 
 
31 Opinion 2/13, cit., para. 191. 
32 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 April 2016, joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru. 
33 S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGY, Joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Converging human rights standards, mu-
tual trust and new grounds for postponing a European Arrest Warrant, in European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2016, p. 197 et seq. It is important to underline that the Court qualifies 
such risk of a manifest violation as a ground for postponement of execution of a request for judicial co-
operation. 
34 Kossowski, cit., para. 53. 
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besides formalities and blind automatisms. From this point of view, the Court seems to 
detach itself from its findings on the limits to mutual recognition arising from violations 
of fundamental rights, where qualified external sources of information concerning the 
deficiencies on the protection of a right play a key role.35 
Consequently, the receiving authority is entitled to prosecute the same person for 
the same facts only insofar as the foreign one evidently failed to perform its evidentiary 
tasks. The Court also seems to imply that, in the event of a doubt, the receiving authori-
ty should in principle rely on the activity and the assessment made abroad, in order not 
to undermine mutual trust. Of course, such conclusion would be regrettable in case of a 
lack of transparency on the part of the issuing authority, where the reasons stated in its 
decision on the evidentiary background and on the assessment of the merits made 
were elusive. 
The latter adjective seems to leave room for further implications. By referring to “a 
detailed investigation”, the Court appears to set a high standard for a determination of 
the merits to have occurred, in particular in the event of out-of-court decisions. The early 
stage of the proceeding and the frequent lack of a domestic court’s assessment of the 
evidence collected suggest that only a truly complete investigation and a carefully rea-
soned decision can trigger the right not to be tried or punished twice. Reading between 
the lines, also in light of the factual background of the case, this finding warns national 
authorities to ensure an effective coordination of jurisdictions. Besides theoretical crite-
ria for determining jurisdiction, the authority that is in practice best placed in order to 
perform a detailed investigation should in principle be awarded the case. Preventive ju-
dicial dialogue on the allocation of a case should then include a cost-benefit assessment 
concerning the availability of evidence, in terms of rapidity, ease and evidentiary value.36  
In conclusion, Kossowski adds a new crack in the solid wall of mutual recognition 
and mutual trust. These principles are not blind and entitle the receiving authority to 
exercise a limited scrutiny on the foreign authority’s activity. The finding of the Court of 
Justice is focused on the ne bis in idem principle under Arts 54 CISA and 50 of the Char-
ter, and counts where no common EU rules harmonizing national legal orders are ap-
plied. However, it can arguably be extended to other aspects of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. Even national decisions founded on EU secondary acts, as long as they 
show a plain lack of diligence or an evidently insufficient collection and assessment of 
evidence on the part of the issuing authority, should in principle bar mutual recognition 
and mutual trust. 
 
35 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., paras 89, 94 and 104. 
36 Effective collection of evidence is mentioned in recital no. 4 of Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA 
among the criteria which should guide national authorities during direct consultations on the allocation 
of jurisdiction. 
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Consequently, building on Aranyosi and Căldăraru, the Court identifies by analogy 
the edges of a new source of limits to mutual recognition and mutual trust. At the same 
time, the Court shows a manifest favor integrationis and once again qualifies the limit 
to the full effectiveness of judicial cooperation in criminal matters as a last resort. As it 
is for plain violations of fundamental rights, the lack of a detailed investigation should 
amount to blocking judicial cooperation only in exceptional situations. In fact, both 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru and Kossowski lines of case law are intended to provide a cure 
for severe pathologies affecting national legal orders. The application of judicial coop-
eration mechanisms can never result in the recognition of decisions which are manifest-
ly contrary to essential purposes of the EU legal order, such as the protection of fun-
damental rights and the establishment of an area of security and justice. 
